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LOOKING PAST A SMOKE SCREEN: A FIRST





On August 23, 1996, President Clinton declared his support for
the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") new rule restricting
tobacco access and advertising to children.' The new rule, pub-
lished in the Federal Register on August 28, 1996,2 marks the first
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998; B.A. Skidmore College, 1991. The
author wishes to thank Gina Scinta for her continual support and patience.
See John Carey, Antismoking Plan Won't Exactly Kick Butt, Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 9, 1996, at 42.
2 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,615 (1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897). The FDA's new rule:
prohibits the sale of nicotine-containing cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco to individuals under the age of 18 and requires manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers to comply with certain conditions regarding
access to, and promotion of, these products. Among other things, the
final rule requires retailers to verify a purchaser's age by photographic
identification. It also prohibits all free samples and prohibits the sale
of these products through vending machines and self-service displays
except in facilities where individuals under the age of 18 are not
present or permitted at any time. The rule also limits the advertising
and labeling to which children and adolescents are exposed. The rule
accomplishes this by generally restricting advertising to which children
and adolescents are exposed to a black-and-white, text-only format. In
addition, billboards and other outdoor advertising are prohibited within
1,000 feet of schools and public playgrounds. The rule also prohibits
the sale or distribution of brand-identified promotional, nontobacco
items such as hats and tee shirts. Furthermore, the rule prohibits
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time in American history that the FDA has regulated tobacco
products. The FDA independently determined in 1996 that it has
jurisdiction over tobacco products, 4 despite repeated congressional
rejection of proposed legislation which would have amended the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act' to confer the FDA with such
authority.'
sponsorship of sporting and other events, teams, and entries in a brand
name of a tobacco product, but permits such sponsorship in a corporate
name.
61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
' See generally Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and
These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996).
4 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,628. The rule provides:
FDA is asserting jurisdiction over cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
under the drug and device provisions of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic]
Act. Specifically, FDA has concluded that cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco are combination products consisting of nicotine, a drug that
causes addiction and other significant pharmacological effects on the
human body, and device components that deliver nicotine to the body.
Id.
' The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)). The Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") limits the jurisdiction of the FDA to those products
which are either a "drug" or a "device." See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2) (1994)
(stating that "the term 'drug' means ... articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man"); 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2)
(1994) (stating that "the term 'device' ... means instruments, apparatus, and
contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man"). See generally Michael
Whatley, Note, The FDA v. Joe Camel: An Analysis of the FDA 's Attempt to
Regulate Tobacco and Tobacco Products Under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 22 J. LEGIS. 121 (1996) (examining the history of tobacco
regulation and the FDA from the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906
through the issuance of the FDA's new rule, and analyzing jurisdictional
challenges to the new rule).
6 During the course of this century, Congress has consistently made clear
that tobacco products are not subject to FDA jurisdiction. See S. 1682, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) and H.R. 5973, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (recognizing
that both houses rejected a bill which would put all smoking products under FDA
authority); H.R. 11280, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (noting that the House of
Representatives rejected a bill which would amend the FDCA to grant the FDA
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Few government agency rules have sparked as much contro-
versy as the FDA's tobacco regulations.7 Opponents to the new
rule have attacked its provisions primarily on two grounds, arguing
that Congress has not conferred the FDA with jurisdiction over
tobacco products, 8 and that the rule's advertising provisions
regulatory authority over cigarettes); S. 1468, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929)
(noting that the Senate rejected a bill which would bring tobacco products within
jurisdiction of federal agencies that enforce the nation's drug laws); H.R. REP.
No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3718, 3725 (1984) (declaring that "[f]ederal laws that protect the public from
hazardous food, drugs and consumer products do not apply to cigarettes").
7 The FDA receivedmore than 700,000 public comments concerning its new
rule. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,657. But what will probably be remembered most
about the controversy surrounding the FDA's tobacco regulations was the role
they played in the 1996 U.S. presidential election:
About the only thing everyone agrees on in the contentious debate over
government regulation of cigarettes is the Clinton administration's
brilliant political timing in releasing its final tobacco regulations.
Issued on the heels of a new report showing an upswing in teen-age
drug use, and on the eve of the Democratic convention, the regulation
garnered a lot of favorable press for President Clinton.
Claudia McLachlan, Tobacco's Road is Smooth: FDA Regs Face Legal Fight,
19 NAT'L L. J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B1. In fact, Republican presidential candidate
Bob Dole, a supporter of tobacco interests, received widespread criticism during
his campaign for publicly stating that he did not believe that cigarette smoking
was addictive. See Carey, supra note 1, at 48.
s See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,407-09 ("[The] FDA received several comments on
whether section 520(e) of the [FDCA] authorizes restrictions on youth access and
advertising. Most of the comments were from tobacco trade associations, tobacco
companies, and advertisers, arguing that section 520(e) of the act does not
provide authority for either the access or advertising restrictions."). See generally
Comments of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Liggett Group Inc.,
Lorillard Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Incorporated, R.J Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Tobacco Institute Inc. Before the United States Food and Drug
Administration, Docket Nos. 95N-0253 and 95N-0253J, Vol. I, "FDA Lacks
Jurisdiction Over Cigarettes" [hereinafter Comments ofBrown & Williamson] (on
file with Journal of Law and Policy).
A copy of these comments may be obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") request to the FDA. FOIA requests must be in
writing, and should include the requestor's name, address and telephone number;
a description of the documents being sought, such as the full cite to the
Comments of Brown & Williamson given above; and a statement concerning
365
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deprive tobacco manufacturers, advertisers and retailers of their
First Amendment right to promote tobacco products. 9 Indeed,
almost immediately after the FDA issued its proposed regulations
in August 1995, tobacco manufacturers, retailers and advertisers
filed lawsuits against the FDA in federal court in Greensboro,
North Carolina, seeking declaratory judgment invalidating the new
rule on these two grounds.'0
This Note is primarily concerned with whether or not the rule's
advertising provisions pass constitutional muster. This Note argues
that the FDAs advertising provisions violate the First Amendment
by unjustifiably restricting commercial free speech. Part I briefly
describes the FDA's new rule, the FDA's claimed purpose behind
it, and opponents' criticisms of the rule's advertising restrictions.
Part II discusses the commercial free speech doctrine as developed
by the United States Supreme Court, and in particular, examines a
recent decision by the Court, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island," which concerned advertising restrictions on alcoholic
beverages similar to the FDA's new advertising restrictions on
tobacco products. Part III analyzes the FD/s new tobacco
advertising restrictions under the commercial free speech doctrine
willingness to pay any duplicating and processing fees, including any limitations
thereon. All FOIA requests to the FDA should be sent to: Food and Drug
Administration, Freedom of Information Staff (HF1-35), 5600 Fishers Lane,
Rockville, Maryland20857, or by facsimile to (301) 443-1726. See <http://www-
.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/foiahand.html> (visited Oct. 26, 1997).
9 See generally 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,469-538 (discussing public comments
received by the FDA concerning the constitutionality of the FDA's new rule
under the First Amendment); Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8,
at Vol. IX, "FDA's Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising Would
Violate the First Amendment."
'0 See generally Coyne Beahm Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Admin.,
966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). In Coyne Beahm, Judge Osteen held that
Congress has not withheld jurisdiction to regulate tobacco from the FDA. Id. at
1379. The court also held that the FDCA authorized the FDA to issue only
certain regulations aimed at curbing children's access to tobacco products, and
that the FDA did not have authority under the FDCA to issue its proposed
advertising and promotion restrictions on tobacco products. Id. at 1400. Judge
Osteen declined, however, to determine whether the FDA's promotion and
advertising restrictions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 1400 n.33.
" 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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and concludes that the FDA's new rule violates tobacco manufac-
turers' First Amendment rights.
I. THE RULE
The FDA first announced that it was proposing new regulations
concerning tobacco products on August 11, 1995.12 After a
lengthy public comment period, the FDA published its final rule on
tobacco in the Federal Register in August 1996.13 The first part of
the FDA's new rule is aimed at restricting youth access to tobacco
products," while the second- part contains the advertising restric-
tions which the FDA claims are vital to the effectiveness of its
access regulations."
A. The FDA's Purpose Behind the Youth Access Restrictions
In its introduction to the new rule, the FDA reported that
tobacco use is the single leading cause of preventable death in the
United States. 16 The FDA found that this grave health problem
2 See Proposed Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents,
60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995). Annexed to the FDA's proposed rule was a separate
document in which the FDA reported its conclusion that it had jurisdiction over
tobacco products under the FDCA. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453-787
(1995).
13 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the new rule).
14 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,616-17 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897, Subpart B). The
first part of the FDA's new rule prohibits access to cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco for any person under the age of eighteen. 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(a).
Prohibition is enforced by 1) requiring retailers to verify that no person
purchasing tobacco products is younger than 18 years of age, 2) forbidding
distribution of free tobacco samples and 3) banning the sale of tobacco products
through vending machines except in facilities where the retailer ensures that no
person younger than eighteen is present. 21 C.F.R. § 897.16.
's 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,466.
16 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398. The FDA reported that more than 400,000 people
die each year from tobacco-related illnesses. Id. (citing CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CIGARETTE
367
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could not be addressed by completely banning cigarettes due to the
high addiction rates of such a product.'7 Instead, the FDA con-
cluded that the best way to halt the death and disease caused by
cigarettes is to eliminate or reduce the number of addicted
consumers. 
18
The agency further concluded that elimination of addiction to
tobacco can only be achieved by preventing children from starting
to use tobacco products.' 9 The FDA found that:
[m]ost people who suffer the adverse health consequences
of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their use
before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not
prepared for, or equipped to, make a decision that, for
many will have lifelong consequences.. . . When cigarette
and smokeless tobacco use by children and adolescents
results in addiction, as it so often does, these youths lose
their freedom to choose whether or not to use the products
as adults.20
SMOKING-ATTRIBUTABLE MORTALITY AND YEARS OF POTENTIAL LIFE
LOST-UNITED STATES, 1990 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
645-49 (1993)).
17 Id. The FDA stated that:
[b]ecause of the high addiction rates and the difficulties smokers
experience when they attempt to quit, there may be adverse health
consequences for many individuals if the products were to be
withdrawn suddenly from the marketplace. Our current health care
system and available pharmaceuticals may not be able to provide
adequate or sufficiently safe treatment for such a precipitous with-
drawal.
Id. The FDA concluded that a ban in all probability would result in the
development of a black market to supply addicted users with tobacco products.
60 Fed. Reg. at 41,349. The preamble to the 1995 proposed rule discussed the
possibility that "[t]he products that would be available through a black market
could very well be more dangerous (e.g., cigarettes containing more tar or
nicotine, or more toxic additives) than products currently on the market." Id.
"S 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398.
19 Id. at 44,399.
20 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398. The FDA reported that "approximately 3 million
American adolescents currently smoke, and an additional 1 million adolescent
males use smokeless tobacco." Id. In addition, 82% of adults who had ever
smoked reported that they had their first cigarette before they were 18 years old,
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Based upon this finding, the FDA determined that restrictions
which would substantially reduce the number of children who
become addicted to cigarettes would best serve the public.2' The
FDA further concluded that the best way to achieve such a
reduction "is by limiting the access to, and attractiveness of,
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to young people."" This purpose
is codified in the first part of the FDAs new rule.23
B. The FDA's Purpose Behind the Advertising Restrictions
The second part of the FDAs new rule drastically restricts
tobacco product advertising, promotion and labeling. Specifically,
the provisions: 1) limit advertising generally to a black-and-white,
text-only format, except for advertising in certain "adult" periodi-
cals;24 2) prohibit billboards and other outdoor advertising that are
within 1,000 feet of schools and public playgrounds; 25 3) prohibit
the sale and distribution of non-tobacco items, such as t-shirts and
hats that carry tobacco product brand names and logos; 26 and 4)
limit tobacco product sponsorship of sporting and other events to
the corporate name only.27 These advertising restrictions represent
a sweeping ban on the dissemination of information about tobacco
products.
The FDA stated that the purpose behind its advertising
restrictions is to "ensure that the restrictions on access are not
and that more than half of these individuals became regular smokers by age 18.
Id.
21 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
22 Id.
23 21 C.F.R. § 897.2 (1996). The rule provides that:
[t]he purpose of this part is to establish restrictions on the sale,
distribution, and use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in order to
reduce the number of children and adolescents who use these products,
and to reduce the life-threatening consequences associated with tobacco
use.
Id.
24 21 C.F.R. § 897.32.
25 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b).
26 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a).
27 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c).
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undermined by the product appeal that advertising for these
products creates for young people., 28 The FDA has concluded that
cigarette advertising entices children to smoke, and a rule without
advertising restrictions would be ineffective in the reduction of
tobacco use among children.29
The FDA based this conclusion upon its findings of a causal
link between cigarette advertising and a child's decision to begin
smoking,30 and "a positive effect of stringent advertising measures
on smoking rates and on youth tobacco use.",3 1 In reaching these
findings, the FDA "relied heavily" upon two reports,32 a 1994
report by the Institute of Medicine (the "1OM Report") 33 and a
1994 Surgeon General's Report (the "SGR"). 34 The FDA cited
these two reports as support for its conclusion that "advertising was
an important factor in young people's tobacco use, and that
restrictions on advertising must be part of any meaningful approach
to reducing smoking and smokeless tobacco use among young
people., 35 Based upon this evidence, the agency determined that
its advertising restrictions, in addition to access regulations, will
reduce underage smoking while still preserving the important
28 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,465.




13 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GROWING
UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND
YOUTHS (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994)).
34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994)).
'5 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,466. The FDA argues that 1) advertising campaigns
such as "Joe Camel" directly influence children's decisions to smoke; 2) young
people's exposure to cigarette advertising is positively related to smoking
behavior and their intention to smoke; 3) cigarette advertising helps young people
to decide what is normal or socially acceptable behavior; 4) those who
overestimate the prevalence of smoking seem to be more likely to begin smoking
and become a regular smoker; and 5) brand advertising is particularly effective
with children, and that the three most heavily advertised brands of cigarettes are
smoked by 86% of young people who smoke. See generally id.
370
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informational components of tobacco advertising such as price, tar
and nicotine levels and taste.36
C. Opponents' Criticisms Concerning the Tobacco
Advertising Restrictions
Opponents of the FDNs advertising restrictions disagree with
the FDA's conclusions and argue that advertising bans will not
succeed in reducing underage smoking. Specifically, opponents
assert that the evidence cited by the FDA to support its advertising
restrictions-the IOM Report and the SGR in particular-fail to
provide a causal link between cigarette advertising and the decision
by young people to smoke.37 Establishing such a link is critical if
the FDA is to constitutionally justify its restrictions on tobacco
advertising.38
Upon review of the evidence proffered by the FDA, it appears
that the agency has failed to link cigarette advertising with
underage smoking. In fact, opponents point out that the IOM
Report and the SGR actually recognize the absence of such a
link.39 For instance, the IOM Report stated that an implication of
a causal link between exposure to advertising and consumption of
tobacco products "is questionable," and that it "is not known at
present... whether youths already interested in smoking become
more attentive to advertisements or whether advertisements lead
36 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396, 44,465, 44,469, 44,496-97.
17 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,487 ("Several comments appeared to place great
importance on the fact that both reports [IOM Report and SGR] acknowledge
that the psychosocial and econometric research that they present do not prove
that cigarette advertising causes young people to begin smoking or to use
smokeless tobacco."); see generally Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra
note 8, Vol. VII, at 49-59, Vol. IX, at 26-32.
3 See infra Part III.D (arguing that without establishing such a link, the
FDA cannot show that advertising restrictions directly advance its interest in
preventing youth smoking).
'9 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,487 (reporting that "[a]nother comment claimed that
the IOM Report acknowledges the lack of a causal relationship between
advertising and smoking and acknowledges that the very econometric studies it
cites are unreliable to determine whether advertising contributes to youth
smoking behavior").
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youths to become more interested in smoking. '" Similarly, the
SGR noted that it did not address the "causal" question between
advertising and consumption, stating that "no study of the direct
relationship of cigarette advertising to smoking initiation has been
reported in the literature.""' Thus, it appears that the FDA's
evidence fails to establish that tobacco advertising affects children's
decisions to smoke.
Aside from the lack of persuasive evidence linking cigarette
advertising with underage smoking, critics point out that there is
substantial research demonstrating that advertising does not
significantly influence children to smoke.42 Rather, this research
shows that the critical influences on a child's decision to begin
smoking are the behavior of peers and family members and the
child's perception of the cost and benefits of smoking.43 Oppo-
nents to the FDKs advertising restrictions cite as an example of
such research the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") lengthy
study of the "Joe Camel" advertising campaign. 4 After reviewing
comprehensive studies and statistics, the FTC found that,
"[a]lthough it may seem intuitive to some that [the] Joe Camel
40 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING
NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 124 (1994 Richard J. Bonnie
& Barbara S. Lynch, eds. 1994).
41 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING
TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
188 (1994).
42 See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol. VII at 49; 61
Fed. Reg. at 44,486. The FDA reported that:
[t]he comment further argued that an analysis based upon this
theoretical model [an econometric analysis performed for RJR] by Dr.
Beales found that neither advertising nor advertising expenditures has
an appreciable effect on young people's perceptions of the benefits of
smoking and thus would have no indirect effect on teenage smoking
decisions.
61 Fed. Reg. at 44,486.
4' See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol. VII, at 23-25;
61 Fed. Reg. at 44,486 ("Several comments from the advertising and tobacco
industries claimed that the econometric studies performed for them by experts
found that peers, parents, and siblings have the greatest influence on young
people's decisions to start smoking.").
"See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol. VII, at 118-23.
SMOKE SCREEN
advertising campaign would lead more children to smoke or lead
children to smoke more, the evidence to support that intuition is not
there."'45 This study by the FTC and others like it heavily under-
mine the FDA's contention that an advertising ban will reduce
underage smoking.46 As discussed below, the FDA's restrictions on
commercial speech cannot pass constitutional muster in the face of
the FDA's failure to present sufficient support for its assertion that
advertising restrictions will decrease underage smoking.47
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH
Freedom of speech is one of the very foundations upon which
our country-and our constitution-were formed. The First
Amendment48 has been utilized to strike down state regulations
which violate individuals' rights to freedom of religion and
41 See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note, Vol. IX, at 27-28
(citing the joint statement of Commissioners Azcuenaga, Owen, and Starek of
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., FTC File No. 9323162 (released June 7, 1994)).
46 Opponents to the FDA's rule make reference to numerous studies
questioning the effectiveness of tobacco advertising restrictions including: C.
Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon General Report (1989) ("There is no scientifically
rigorous study available to the public that provides a definitive answer to the
basic question of whether advertising and promotion increase the level of tobacco
consumption."); E. Whelan, American Counsel of Science and Health (1985) (An
advertising ban would "probably not" reduce cigarette consumption in the United
States.); The Ontario Task Force on Smoking (1982) ("No persuasive empirical
evidence exists" to support the contention that advertising is a significant
determinant of smoking.); J. Hamilton, 3rd World Conference on Smoking and
Health (1975) (explaining that cigarette advertising is "a competitive weapon"
and "has not been used as a means for expanding [the] market"). See generally
Comments of Brown & Willismson, supra note 8, Vol. VII.
47 See infra Part III.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
freedom of political expression. 49 The First Amendment, however,
has not always been recognized as a protector of commercial
speech. In fact, some early Supreme Court decisions had suggested
that the First Amendment afforded no protection to commercial
speech. ° It was not until 1975, in Bigelow v Jirginia,51 that the
Supreme Court firmly embraced the notion that commercial speech
is protected by the First Amendment. 2
In Bigelow, the Supreme Court found error in the lower court's
assumption that an abortion advertisement was unprotected by the
First Amendment merely because it was commercial speech.53 The
Court held that the advertisement warranted First Amendment
protection due to "consumer interest in commercial speech and the
need it served in fueling personal decisions within the free market
system., 54 The Bigelow Court stated that the advertisement, which
announced the availability of legal abortions in New York, "did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained
factual material of clear public interest.",55 Thus, the First Amend-
ment protects advertising not only because it conveys transactional
information concerning a product such as price information and
store location, but also because it fulfills an indispensable role as
a necessary medium of information which is of great interest to the
public.56
41 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that the
refusal of a state university to allow student religious groups to meet anywhere
on campus violates the religious group's First Amendment rights to free speech
and association); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down a state
regulation that closed down newspapers which criticized local officials).
'o See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976) ("There can be no question that in past
decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is
unprotected."); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that
the United States Constitution imposes no restraints on government with respect
to regulations restricting purely commercial speech).
"' 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
52 Id. at 822.
13 Id. at 825-26.
54 Id. at 819.
55 Id. at 822.
56 Id.; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
374
SMOKE SCREEN
By applying the First Amendment to commercial information
regarding abortions in Bigelow, the Supreme Court has prohibited
government regulation which suppresses commercial speech that is
based upon a highly paternalistic government interest. The Court
has recognized that "' [p]eople will perceive their own best interests
if and only they are well enough informed, and... the best means
to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them ....
Although protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech
is not necessarily entitled to the same degree of constitutional
protection as other forms of protected speech.5" Because commer-
cial speech is firmly attached to the business transaction that it
proposes, a state's interest in regulating the transaction may give it
an incidental interest in the expression itself.59 "For this reason,
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising ...
[c]onsequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity."); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court struck
down a state statute prohibiting the advertising of prescription drugs, stating that:
[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we
preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. The Supreme Court confirmed that the public has the right to obtain
commercial information and cannot be refused this right because of "paternal-
istic" goals of the state. Id. at 770.
s7 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 770).
5" See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("We
instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression.").
'9 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). In Edenfield, the Court
375
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laws restricting commercial speech ... need only be tailored in a
reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in order to
survive First Amendment scrutiny."'6 Thus, the entire commercial
speech doctrine, as it has developed over the last two decades,
"represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear
expression about goods and services and the right of government
to regulate the sales of such goods and services."'" Striking the
appropriate balance between these two competing interests,
however, has proven difficult. To aid in balancing these interests,
the Supreme Court established a First Amendment test for
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
v Public Service Commission of New York.62
A. The Central Hudson Test
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set forth a four prong
test to be applied by a reviewing court when determining whether
a governmental regulation violates the First Amendment's protec-
tion of commercial speech.63 The first prong of the test requires
a determination that the commercial speech at issue concerns a
recognized the government's interest in preventing fraud and ensuring privacy
with respect to solicitations by certified public accountants. Id. at 770. See also
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989)
(holding that the state's interests in speech relating to the sale of products in
campus dormitories included promoting an educational rather than promotional
atmosphere, promoting safety and security, preventing commercial exploitation
of students and preserving residential tranquility).
60 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
6' 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1506 (1996) (quoting
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-15, at 903 (2d ed.
1988)).
62 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
63 Id. at 566. Central Hudson involved a regulation promulgated by the New
York State Public Service Commission which completely banned promotional
advertising by utilities. Id. at 559. At the time, the nation was experiencing a fuel
shortage, and the New York agency had concluded that promotional advertising
was contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. Id. The Central Hudson
Court held that the regulation, which completely suppressed advertising, was
more extensive than necessary to promote the state interest in energy conversa-
tion and therefore violated the First Amendment. Id. at 570.
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lawful activity and is not misleading.' The second part of the test
requires that the asserted governmental interest is substantial.65 If
the answers to these two inquiries are positive, the third prong of
the Central Hudson test requires a determination that the regulation
at issue "directly advances the governmental interest asserted.
66
Finally, the fourth prong requires that the regulation be no more
"extensive than is necessary" to serve the interest asserted by the
government. 67 The last two prongs of the Central Hudson test are
critical to a regulation's survival, and are sometimes described as
requiring a reasonable "'fit between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.' "68
Since Central Hudson, however, some confusion has developed
over the "reasonable fit" requirement as it is set forth in the third
and fourth prongs of the test. In fact, courts applying the Central
Hudson test have raised several questions concerning the "reason-
able fit" requirement which are relevant to a First Amendment
analysis of the FDA's new rule restricting tobacco advertising. For
instance, who has the burden of proving whether the commercial
speech regulation directly advances the state's interest, and how is
that burden satisfied?69 How does one determine whether the
' Id.; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect
commercial speech concerning unlawful activities).
61 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
66 Id.
67 Id.
6 Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989) (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
341 (1986)).
69 See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
In Metromedia, the Court found that a city ordinance prohibiting billboard
advertisements directly advanced the city's interest in preventing traffic accidents
and preserving the city's beauty. Id. at 507. The Metromedia Court was
extremely deferential to the legislature's reasons behind the regulation and
created doubt as to the teeth of the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
Compare United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (finding
that "Congress clearly was entitled to determine that ... advertising of lotteries
undermines... a policy against gambling") with Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (holding that an alcohol labeling ban violated the First
Amendment because other regulations prevented the ban from advancing the
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regulation is more extensive than necessary, and what role does the
availability of alternative regulations which do not restrict speech
have in this analysis? 70 Does the government's power to com-
pletely ban the sale of a product entitle its restriction on commer-
cial speech relating to that product greater deference under the
Central Hudson test?71 Finally, are advertisements for so-called
"vice" products afforded the same commercial speech protection as
other products? 72 The Supreme Court finally answered these
questions in 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island.73 In Liquormart, the
Court resolved the confusion surrounding the "reasonable fit"
requirement of the Central Hudson test, and set precedent for a
future decision analyzing the FDA's restrictions on tobacco
advertising.
government's interest in a direct and material way).
70 See, e.g., Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
480 (1989). In Fox, a corporation sought an injunction against a state university
based upon the university's refusal to allow the corporation to present demonstra-
tions to students within university dormitories. Id. at 470. In denying injunctive
relief, the Court held that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test did not
require that the restriction be the absolute least restrictive means to achieve the
state's desired end. Id. at 477. See also Posadas de P. R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co.
of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (holding that the Puerto Rico legislature could
choose to reduce gambling of natives by suppressing in-state casino advertising
rather than engaging in educational speech).
71 See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc., 478 U.S. 328. In Posadas, the Court
upheld a statue banning advertisements for casino gambling in Puerto Rico. Id.
at 331. The Court stated that Puerto Rico's "greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
casino gambling." Id at 345-46.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
In Edge, the Court upheld a federal ban restricting broadcasters licensed in non-
lottery states from advertising other states' lotteries. Id. at 419. The Court stated
that "[g]ambling implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into
a category of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned
altogether." Id. at 426.
71 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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B. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Liquormart, a case
involving a dispute similar to the one over the FDAs tobacco
advertising restrictions. 74 Liquormart concerned a Rhode Island
statute which prohibited alcohol advertisements from referencing
prices. 75 The state of Rhode Island claimed that the ban on alcohol
product price advertising advanced the state's interest by "promot-
ing temperance., 76 Rhode Island argued that price advertising of
alcohol products could stimulate price wars which it believed would
lower product prices and thus lead to more abusive consumption of
alcohol.77 Liquor store operators brought suit arguing that the
state's regulations denied them their constitutional right to freedom
of speech and denied the citizens of Rhode Island their consti-
tutional right to obtain accurate price information about alcohol, a
lawful product.78 In a decision holding that the advertising
restrictions violated First Amendment rights, the Court finally
answered the previously unresolved questions surrounding the
Central Hudson "reasonable fit" requirement and, in doing so,
made clear that the FDAs tobacco advertising restrictions are
unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
1. Who Has the Burden of Proving Whether the Regulation
Directly Advances the State Asserted Interest
and How Is That Burden Satisfied?
Liquormart made clear that, under the third prong of the
Central Hudson test, the government bears the burden of proving
that a reasonable fit exists between its chosen means and desired
end. The Court held that the government must show that the
challenged commercial speech regulation advances the substantial
"' See generally id.
71 Id. at 1515.
76 Id. at 1509.
77 id.
7' Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (No 94-1140).
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interest in a "direct way. ' 79 The state's proffered justification for
the regulation would not be accepted at face value.8° Rather, the
Court determined that the state must demonstrate, with evidentiary
support, that its speech restrictions will directly advance the state's
interest.8' The Court warned that a commercial speech regulation
"'may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose."'8 2 The Liquormart Court
also advised that, although commercial speech is usually afforded
less protection by the First Amendment than other types of
constitutionally protected speech, Rhode Island's statute would be
subject to a more stringent constitutional review, because the statute
placed sweeping restrictions on commercial speech in order to serve
an end unrelated to consumer protection. The Court stated that:
[b]ans that target truthful nonmisleading commercial
messages rarely protect consumers from [public] harm[].
Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an underly-
ing governmental policy that could be implemented without
regulating speech. In this way, these commercial speech
bans not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede
debate over central issues of public policy.83
'9 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1499, 1509 ("The State bears the burden of
showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but.., will do
so to a material degree. The need for... such a showing is particularly great
given the drastic nature of its chosen means-the wholesale suppression of
truthful, nonmisleading information."); see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.
Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995) ("[T]he Government carries the burden of showing that
the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest in a direct and
material way."); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) ("The penultimate
prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a regulation impinging upon
commercial expression directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation
may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose.").
80 Liquonnart, 116 S. Ct. at 1522.
s Id.
82 Id. at 1509 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
13 Id. at 1508 ("[C]omplete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of expression . . .are particularly dangerous
because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain
information."); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with
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The Court expressed its concern that by asserting an all-encom-
passing interest such as protecting the public from harm, a
government could easily disguise hidden objectives within a broad
ban on commercial speech. 4 The Court considered such prophy-
lactic bans to be "dangerous" because "they all but foreclose
alternative means of disseminating certain information,"85 and
"suspect" because they suppress the free flow of truthful informa-
tion in a clandestine manner.
8 6
The Liquormart Court found Rhode Island's ban on alcohol
product price advertising to be particularly suspect because the state
was essentially attempting to foster temperance by keeping the
public ignorant of the price of alcoholic products.87 The Court
held that a "State legislature does not have the broad discretion to
suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes."88 The Court therefore found that the need for Rhode
Island to meet its burden of proving that the statute would advance
the state's interest in a material way was "particularly great given
special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to
pursue a nonspeech-relatedpolicy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could
screen from public view the underlying governmental policy . . . . Indeed, in
recent years this court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech
unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it was
deceptive or related to unlawful activity."); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 ("[A]
State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of other objectives
that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.").
84 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508. The Court stated:
[p]recisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or
overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that
the public will respond "irrationally" to the truth .... The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that
seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to
be their own good.
Id.
85 Id. at 1507.
86 Id. at 1508.
87 Id. at 1508 n.13.
88 Id. at 1511. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (holding that a state may not completely suppress the
dissemination of truthful information about an entirely lawful activity).
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the drastic nature of its chosen means-the wholesale suppression
of truthful, nonmisleading information." 9
Rhode Island attempted to meet its burden by claiming that
without a ban on alcohol price advertising, the price of alcohol
could drop, and abusive consumption of alcohol would rise within
the state.90 Based upon these conclusions, Rhode Island asserted
that its advertising restrictions directly promoted temperance and
prevented abusive consumption of alcohol.9'
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found that Rhode
Island failed to meet its burden of proving that the price advertising
ban would significantly advance the state's interest in promoting
temperance. 92 Specifically, the Court held that there was insufficient
evidence linking temperance and prevention of abusive alcohol
consumption with Rhode Island's restrictions on price advertis-
ing.93 The Court found that "[a]lthough the record suggests that
the price advertising ban may have some impact on the purchasing
patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means ... the State has
presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will
significantly reduce market-wide consumption."94 The govern-
ment's burden, the Court explained, is not satisfied by mere
speculation and conjecture;95 rather, the government must show
that the problems targeted by the regulations are real and that the
regulations will alleviate them to a "material" degree.96
'9 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
90 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (No. 94-1140).
91 Id.
92 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
9 Id. at 1509.
94 Id.
" Id. at 1510 ("Speculation and conjecture [are] unacceptable means of
demonstrating that a restriction on commercial speech directly advances the
state's asserted interest .... [S]peculation certainly does not suffice when the
State takes aim at accurate commercial information for a paternalistic end."); see
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (stating that the "burden is not
satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking
to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms
it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree").
96 Liquorinart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
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Rhode Island failed to make such a showing. As a result, the state's
statute failed the third prong of the Central Hudson test, parti-
cularly under the heightened scrutiny mandated by the First
Amendment in the case of such sweeping restrictions on commer-
cial speech.
Based upon Liquormart, it seems clear that the Court will not
tolerate broad bans on commercial speech when the government
disguises its true interest behind unsupported assertions of public
harm.
2. How does a Reviewing Court Determine Whether a
Regulation Is More Extensive Than Necessary
and What Role Does the Availability of
Alternative Regulations Which Do Not
Restrict Speech Have in This Analysis?
After examining the third prong of Central Hudson, the
Liquormart Court turned to the fourth prong of the test, which
prohibits a regulation from being "more extensive than is neces-
sary."' This prong requires "a fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the best disposition
but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means, but ... a means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." '98 Thus, a
government must show more than a mere rational relationship
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985) ("Our recent
decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the
free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on
would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the
helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.").
97 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
98 See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479
(1989) ("None of our cases invalidating the regulation of commercial speech
involved a provision that went only marginally beyond what would adequately
have served the government interest. To the contrary, almost all of the
restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson's fourth prong have been
substantially excessive, disregarding far less restrictive and more precise
means.").
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between its chosen means and the desired end. Instead, it must
show that the restriction will reasonably accomplish the desired
end, and will do so in a way such that the extent of the restriction
is consistent with the interest served.
Alternatives which do not restrict speech play an essential part
in this analysis. "A regulation need not be absolutely the least
severe that will achieve the desired end ... but if there are
numerous and obvious less burdensome alternatives to the restric-
tion on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration
in determining whether the fit between ends and means is reason-
able."'99 Applying this "reasonable standard," the Liquormart Court
concluded that the State could not satisfy the requirement that the
restriction on speech be no more extensive than necessary l° The
Court stated that:
[i]t is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation
that would not involve any restriction on speech would be
more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting
temperance. As the State's own expert conceded, higher
prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by
increased taxation. ... Even educational campaigns
focused on the problems of excessive, or even moderate,
drinking might prove to be more effective.'0 '
Thus, a government may not simply choose any method which is
rationally related to its desired goal, but rather must select a
method that is proportional to the interest served. In choosing a
regulation, a government is obligated to consider all potential types
99 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993)
(stating that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place
or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech). See Rubin v.
Coors Co., 115 S. Ct 1585, 1594 (1995) (explaining that the defects in a federal
ban on alcohol advertising "are further highlighted by the availability of
alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections
for commercial speech").
1oo Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510.
101 Id.; see Linmark v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(suggesting that the state use financial incentives or counter-speech, rather than
speech restrictions, to advance its interests).
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of regulation, especially those which are less restrictive of commer-
cial speech. If a less restrictive alternative exists, it must be chosen
by a government, provided that it is as likely to achieve the desired
end.
3. Does the Governments Power to Completely Ban the
Sale of a Product Entitle Its Speech Restriction
to Greater Deference Under the Central Hudson Test?
In Liquormart, Rhode Island asserted that the Court was
required to give particular deference to its legislative choice
because the state could choose to ban the sale of alcoholic
beverages outright.10 2 The state's argument was based upon the
Supreme Court's prior decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico."3 In Posadas,
the Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute which prohibited the
advertising of gambling.' 4 The Court's decision relied heavily on
the fact that the government had the authority to completely ban
gambling altogether, and concluded that "the greater power to
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling."'' 5 The Court
assumed that restrictions on gambling advertisements were less
intrusive than a complete ban on gambling.
In Liquormart, however, the Court declined to follow Posadas,
and declared that "the 'greater includes lesser' argument should be
rejected.' 0 6 The Court stated that it could not see how this
syllogism requires a conclusion that a state's power to regulate
commercial activity is "greater than its power to ban truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech.' 1 7 Contrary to the assumption
,02 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511. The liquor store operators persuasively
argued that Rhode Island's arguments for a lower standard of review virtually
concede that the statute is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.
Brief for Petitioner at 23, Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (No. 94-1140).
103 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 344-46 (emphasis added).
106 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512.
107 Id. at 1513.
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made in Posadas, the Court found it quite clear "that banning
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning
conduct."' 08
The Liquormart Court went on to explain that it would no
longer give deference to state legislative choices where those
choices are to suppress truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech
for the sake of a paternalistic purpose.0 9 The Court stated that:
the casino advertising ban was designed to keep truthful,
nonmisleading speech from members of the public for fear
that they would be more likely to gamble if they received
it. As a result, the advertising ban served to shield the
State's antigambling policy from public scrutiny that more
direct, nonspeech regulation would draw.. . . [Thus,] we
decline to give force to [Posadas'] highly deferential
approach. Instead, in keeping with our prior holdings, we
conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad
discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information
for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was
willing to tolerate.10
Thus, even if the government has the ability to ban the
advertised product entirely, Liquormart makes absolutely clear that
deference will not be given to commercial speech restrictions which
are not for consumer protection but rather for paternalistic
purposes.
4. Are Advertisements for "Vice" Products Afforded the Same
Commercial Speech Protection as Other Products?
Finally, in Liquormart, Rhode Island argued that its statute
should receive deference because alcoholic beverages are so-called
"vice" products, which the state claimed were exceptions to the
commercial speech doctrine."' Rhode Island premised its "vice"
" Id. The Court further stated that "the First Amendment makes clear that
the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous
than attempts to regulate conduct." Id.
'09 Id. at 1511.
110 Id.
... Id. at 1513.
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product argument on language in a 1993 case, United States v
Edge Broadcasting Company."2 At issue in Edge was the consti-
tutionality of statutes restricting the broadcasting of lottery
advertisements in states which did not conduct state-run lot-
teries.1 3 The government in Edge asserted that gambling is not
a constitutionally protected right, but rather falls into a category of
activities normally considered a "vice" activity.14 Although the
Court in Edge held that the statutes at issue passed constitutional
muster under Central Hudson, the Court did seem to accept the
proposition that gambling was a "vice" activity which the govern-
ment could ban altogether.'15
The Liquormart Court, however, specifically rejected Rhode
Island's "vice" argument based upon the language in Edge, holding
that there is no "vice exception" to the protection afforded by the
First Amendment. 1 6 The Court explained that it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to define the scope of any such exception,
because "almost any product that poses some threat to public health
might be reasonably characterized ... as relating to vice activ-
ity.""' 7 In particular, the Court found that the application of a
"vice" label to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets
and playing cards was somewhat inconsistent with the fact that
these are lawful products." 8 Moreover, the Court was concerned
that recognition of a "vice" exception would also permit govern-
ment to justify censorship by merely placing a "vice" label on
112 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993). In Edge, the Supreme Court, applying the
Central Hudson test, held that the restriction on lottery advertising directly
advanced the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction of lotteries in
nonlottery states, while not interfering with the policy of lottery states and
therefore, the fit was a reasonable one. Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 425.
115 Id. at 426 ("As in Posadas .. . the activity underling the relevant
advertising-gambling-implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it
falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been,
banned altogether.").
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selected lawful activities."9 The Court, therefore, held that "a
'vice' label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition
against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a
principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech
about that activity.' ' 20
Thus, Liquormart made clear that for purposes of a Central
Hudson analysis, the measure of protection afforded by the First
Amendment is not determined by the attributes of the underlying
product or conduct-so long as the product or conduct is legal.
Rather, First Amendment protection is determined by the attributes
of the speech that the regulation restricts. Because the price
advertising in Liquormart was truthful and nonmisleading, it was
entitled to full protection under Central Hudson.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FDA's TOBACCO ADVERTISING
RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST
The government has the power to regulate the production of
commercial products in order to strike a balance between a
product's benefits and harms.2 1 However, this regulatory author-
ity does not allow sweeping bans on advertisements where the bans
suppress truthful information of public interest about a lawful
product. 2 2 The Supreme Court requires that would-be regulators
satisfy the Central Hudson test, which focuses on "distinguishing
the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the
"9 Id.; see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1590 (1995)
(declining to adopt a lesser standard for "socially harmful" activities finding that
neither Edge nor Posadas support a lesser standard because both cases applied
the Central Hudson analysis).
120 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
.2 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
122 The Supreme Court has long recognized commercial speech as an
essential medium of public information. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (holding that the First Amendment protects commercial speech not only
because it conveys information concerning a commercial transaction but also




harmless from the harmful" in the speech itself' 23 Thus, in order
to pass constitutional muster, the FDas advertising restrictions on
tobacco products must withstand full scrutiny under the four prong
test of Central Hudson. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Liquormart, however, suggests that it is highly unlikely that the
FDA's regulations will withstand a Central Hudson analysis.
Because the FDNs regulation is not entitled to any deference under
this analysis, it is likely that it will be struck down as an impermis-
sible restriction on commercial speech.
A. The FDA' Restrictions of Tobacco Advertising Are Not
Entitled to Greater Deference Under the Central Hudson
Analysis
In its new rule, the FDA states that its regulation should be
entitled to deference because the FDA has the power to ban
cigarettes entirely and because the FDA believes that tobacco is a
"vice" product. 24 As discussed above, however, the Supreme
Court's decision in Liquormart forecloses any argument by the
FDA that its advertising restrictions are entitled to deference under
the First Amendment. 25
Liquormart rejected the "greater includes lesser" argument in
Posadas because "banning speech may sometimes prove more
intrusive than banning conduct.' 26 The Court made clear that it
would no longer give deference to speech regulation for the sake
of the government's paternalistic purposes. 127 The FDA's purpose
behind the tobacco advertising ban is clearly paternalistic; the ban
is designed to keep truthful, nonmisleading speech from the public
because the FDA believes that the public is more likely to smoke
123 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (quoting
Ibanezv. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2089 (1994)). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
124 61 Fed. Reg. 44,474 (1996).
125 Seesupra Parts II.B.3, II.B.4 (discussing the Liquornart Court's rejection
of the "greater includes lesser" argument and the "vice" exception).
126 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512.
127 Id.
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if it receives such information. The ban on tobacco advertising
therefore serves to conceal the FDA's true goal of delegitimizing
smoking from the public, thus avoiding the public outcry that
would surely ensue if this goal were revealed. Under Liquormart,
however, no deference will be given to the FDNs regulation where
the government cloaks its true paternalistic purposes in the guise of
restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.
The Liquormart Court also dispelled any argument based upon
United States v Edge Broadcasting Company, 28 that the FDA's
restrictions on tobacco advertisements might be entitled to
deference on the basis that smoking is a "vice" activity which is
not protected by the First Amendment. 29 Liquormart rejected a
"vice" exception to the First Amendment because commercial
speech concerning almost any product could be found subject to
lesser constitutional protection where the attributes of the product,
as opposed to attributes of the speech, are the determinative factor.
A "vice" exception to the First Amendment cannot be recognized
because there would be no delimiting factors on the government's
discretion. The FDA could discriminately pick and choose the
products it disfavors on the basis of public health, and suppress
commercial speech related to that product-despite the fact that the
product is legal-without regard to the truthful and important
messages the commercial speech conveys. 30 Such a rule would
render the protection afforded by the First Amendment nonexistent.
As stated above, the Supreme Court has held that unless a
"vice" label is accompanied by a prohibition against the underlying
product or conduct at issue, the mere "vice" label is insufficient
justification for restrictions on commercial speech concerning that
product or conduct.13 ' At present, tobacco use by adults is per-
fectly legal, albeit highly criticized conduct. Thus, because tobacco
products are legal to use and tobacco advertisements convey
truthful important messages, the FDA is not entitled to deference
128 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
129 Id. at 430; Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513.
130 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513.
131 See supra Part II.B.4. (discussing the Liquormart Court's rejection of a
"vice" exception for a regulation which restricts commercial speech).
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under the First Amendment by simply labeling tobacco a "vice"
product.
Because the FDA's regulation restricting tobacco advertisements
are not entitled to any special deference under Posadas or Edge
Broadcasting, they must withstand the same strict analysis under
Central Hudson as regulations restricting advertisements of any
other product. As discussed below, however, applying a strict
analysis under Central Hudson's four prong test reveals that the
FDAs restrictions violate tobacco manufacturers' First Amendment
rights.
B. Tobacco Advertising Is Lawful Activity and Is Not
Misleading
As discussed above, the first prong of the Central Hudson test
inquires whether the commercial speech at issue concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading.1 32 Illegal conduct and/or mislead-
ing commercial speech is afforded no protection by the First
Amendment, and the government clearly has the authority to
regulate such conduct or speech. 133 Thus, tobacco advertising will
receive no protection under the First Amendment unless it is
truthful and promotes legal activity. 134 The FDA claims that
tobacco advertising may not be entitled to constitutional protection
under Central Hudson based upon the FDA's findings that tobacco
advertisements are misleading and arguably relate to illegal activity.
The FDAs argument, however, rests on shaky ground.
First, the FDA claims that tobacco advertisements are mislead-
ing because the imagery of these advertisements depict smokers as
32 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
33 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388 (1973) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect discriminatory
job advertisements in newspapers).
134 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985) (holding that speech relates to unlawful activity only if it proposes and
illegal transaction); Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 388 (holding that a law
prohibiting newspapers from carrying discriminatory job advertisements which
propose the illegal practice of discriminatory hiring was illegal).
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young, healthy, active people when the reality is that cigarette
smoking causes disease and premature death among long-term
users.'35 As such, the FDA argues that tobacco advertisements are
misleading, and therefore, under the first prong of the Central
Hudson test, may not be protected by the First Amendment. This
argument is unpersuasive. Tobacco advertisements make no
statements about the health effects of tobacco use. 36 To the
contrary, under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, 137 all tobacco advertisements are required to carry printed
warnings of a specified size which inform consumers that the
Surgeon General has determined that cigarette smoking causes
disease and premature death.138 Moreover, if tobacco advertise-
ments were in fact misleading as the FDA asserts, because they
make unsupported health claims, all such advertisements would be
prohibited by the FTC. 139
Second, the FDA also argues that tobacco advertising relates to
the illegal activity of selling tobacco products to minors, and thus,
might not be protected speech. 140 Specifically, the FDA claims
"' See Charles Harder, Is it Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical Analysis of
the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and
Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 399, 417
(1995).
'36 See, e.g., Advertisement, Sports Illustrated, Oct. 13, 1997, at 107. This
advertisement depicts a package of "Basic" cigarettes on a wooden table and has
the following headline: "Keep it Basic-Tastes Good. Costs Less." Id. The
advertisement also contains a noticeable Surgeon General's warning. Id.
' Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)); see
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, Pub. L. No. 99-252,
100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4402(b)) (requiring smokeless
tobacco advertisements to carry warning labels).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (a)(3).
"9 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (c)(1).
140 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471 (1996). The FDA stated that:
[f]irst, tobacco ads, at least as a legal matter, propose a commercial
transaction ... that is, to sell cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. In
proposing these transactions, the advertisers do not differentiate
between adult and minor purchasers. Because sales to minors are
unlawful in every state ... the undifferentiated offer to sell constitutes,
at least in part, an unlawful offer to sell . . . . Thus, in a practical
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that tobacco advertising fails to differentiate between adults and
children in its offers to sell tobacco products, and induces children
to illegally purchase and use tobacco products. 4' As discussed
above in Part I, however, studies have shown that tobacco
advertising is not directed at children, and significantly, these
studies have also concluded that tobacco advertising does not
appear to have a positive effect on a young person's decision to
smoke.'42 Thus, the FDA's finding that tobacco advertising
induces children to illegally purchase tobacco products is not
supported by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere fact that tobacco use by minors is illegal
does not mean, however, that all tobacco advertisements propose an
illegal transaction or promote lawless activity. 43 The commercial
free speech doctrine would offer very little protection if the first
prong of the Central Hudson test eliminated challenges to regula-
tions merely because the advertised product may be used illegally
by minors. 44 Based upon this logic, automobile and alcohol
advertisements would be given no First Amendment protection at
all because these products are often illegally sold to and used by
children. Liquormart taught that this is not the case, however, as
the Supreme Court determined that restrictions on alcohol advertis-
ing are subject to Central Hudson's analysis, and hence, First
sense, cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising is proposing
transactions that are illegal... whether or not that is the advertiser's
intent. As such, the protections of the First Amendment might not
attach to such advertising because it proposes an illegal transaction.
Id. (citations omitted).
141 Id.
142 See supra Part I (discussing the lack of evidence linking tobacco
advertising with children's decision to smoke).
143 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that speech relates to unlawful activity only
if it proposes an illegal transaction). The FDA seems to concede this point. 61
Fed. Reg. at 44,471 ("Nevertheless, the [tobacco] advertising also relates to
lawful activity-the sale of tobacco products to adults ... [c]onsequently, FDA
may not have unlimited discretion to regulate tobacco advertising.").
144 Third Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
10, Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp.
1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (No. 2:95CV00591).
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Amendment protection. 145 Similarly, it follows that tobacco
advertising is legal speech under the first prong of the Central
Hudson test, and is protected by the First Amendment.'" As
such, the FDA's restrictions must withstand scrutiny under the
remaining prongs of the Central Hudson test.
C. The Government§ Substantial Interest in Regulating
Tobacco Advertisements
The second step under the Central Hudson test is to determine
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. 47 The
FDA's articulated interest in protecting minors from physical harm
is a substantial governmental interest. 48 Accordingly, the FDA
may seek to prevent young people from becoming dependent on
tobacco products which, over the long term, could adversely affect
their health. 149
The tobacco industry, however, persuasively argues that
although this interest is substantial, it is not served by the FDA's
advertising restrictions. 5 In fact, the tobacco industry asserts that
"4' See generally 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
146 The FDA has virtually conceded this point by admitting that scrutiny of
its advertising restrictions under the remaining three prongs of the Central
Hudson test is appropriate. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,469.
141 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
148 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (holding that a state's
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is
substantial).
149 The FDA argues that tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable
death in the United States. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398. The FDA reports that most
people who become addicted to cigarettes begin smoking before the age of 18.
Id. The FDA further reports that "[w]hen cigarette and smokeless tobacco use by
children and adolescents results in addiction, as it so often does, these youths lose
their freedom to choose whether or not to use the products as adults." Id.
"0 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,473. The FDA reported that:
[o]ne comment said that while FDA's articulated interest in protecting
minors from harm clearly is substantial, this interest is not served by
FDA's regulations. According to the comment, the only goal served
directly by the proposed regulations is that of delegitimatizing
smoking. Two comments said that under the guise of protecting
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the only interest served by the FDAs advertising restrictions is the
delegitimizing of smoking entirely.'5 Notably, in its response, the
FDA denies that it is trying to eliminate smoking altogether.'
Other statements made by the FDA, however, suggest that this is
in fact its true purpose. 1 3 Such an end is not a substantial state
adolescents and children, FDA is trying to "'save' all Americans from
the 'evils' of smoking."
Id.
... 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,469 (reporting that "[s]everal comments, which were
from the tobacco and advertising industries, found in statements made by FDA
evidence of an intent not merely to protect the health of young persons but to
'delegitimize' lawful adult conduct [and] that the FDA's goal is to bring about
the demise of smoking as a social custom").
152 Id. at 44,469-70. The FDA states:
FDA has carefully considered these comments .... FDA's primary
concern is the public health. Because of the potentiality for harmful
effects on individuals under 18 from use of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco, FDA is adopting restrictions on advertising among other
restrictions on the sale, distribution, and use of these products ....
The restrictions will have an adverse effect on the cigarette and
smokeless tobacco companies. However, this fact does not mean that
FDA is trying to bring about the demise of the tobacco industry. The
restrictions that FDA is adopting have been tailored to help reduce
tobacco advertising's ability to create an underage market for these
products, while leaving open ample avenues for cigarette and smoke-
less tobacco companies to communicate to current users 18 years of
age or older about their products. As explained in detail in section
VI.E. of this document, this is all that the First Amendment requires.
Id.
153 For example, the FDA states that "[t]o effectively address the death and
disease caused by tobacco products, addiction to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
must be eliminated or substantially reduced." 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398. The FDA
also reports, however, that "[o]f the 50 million people who use cigarettes, 77 to
92 percent are addicted." Id.
If, as the FDA says, 90 percent of tobacco users are addicted, then the only
way to "effectively address the death and disease from tobacco products" is to
prevent its use altogether, by both adults and children. The FDA rejected an
outright ban on tobacco products altogether, however, claiming that such a ban
would have "adverse health consequences upon" many smokers because the
"current health system and available pharmaceuticals may not be able to provide
adequate or sufficiently safe treatment for such a precipitous withdrawal." Id.
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interest, in light of the fact that, at least at present, the use and sale
of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is legal." 4
Nevertheless, it is likely that the FDA's asserted interest in
protecting the health of minors will be recognized as a substantial
government interest, and thus, the FDA's rule will survive the
second prong of the Central Hudson test.
D. The FDA Regulation Fails to Directly Advance a
Substantial Government Interest
The third prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the
FDA~s new tobacco rule directly advance the government's asserted
interest.' Liquormart makes clear that the burden is on the FDA
to show that its advertising restrictions will reduce underage
smoking in a "direct way."' 56 Mere speculation that these restric-
tions will accomplish this goal will not suffice. 57 Rather, the
FDA must present convincing evidence that its advertising
restrictions will alleviate the problem of underage smoking to a
material degree.'58 Furthermore, the FDA's new rule will receive no
deference, but rather is subject to "close review,"' 59 because the
tobacco advertising restrictions constitute a sweeping ban on
truthful commercial speech. 1
60
154 Id.
13. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
116 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996).
157 Id. at 1511.
... Id. at 1507, 1522.
'" See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care
regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a
nonspeech-related policy."); see also Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508 (sweeping
bans on commercial speech are subject to a more stringent constitutional review).
160 The FDA's new rule broadly prohibits billboard advertising of tobacco
products except for small areas not located near schools, parks, and playgrounds;
it completely prohibits advertising with non-tobacco items such as t-shirts and
hats; it limits sponsorship of sporting events to corporate name only and forbids
color in tobacco advertisements appearing in all publications except for a few
designated "adult" publications by the FDA. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617-18 (1996).
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The FDA falls short of meeting its burden of justifying its
advertising restrictions under the third prong of the Central Hudson
test. In support of its restrictions, the FDA cites statistical evidence
which it claims shows both a relationship between advertising and
youth smoking and the positive effect advertising restrictions have
on smoking rates and youth smoking.'6' However, as discussed
above in Part I.C, this evidence is unreliable as it fails to demon-
strate that advertising causes minors to take up smoking, or that the
FDA's restrictions will prevent young people from starting to
smoke. 162 In fact, substantial evidence exists suggesting a contrary
conclusion. 63 Because the FDA fails to provide sufficient evi-
dence linking its ban on tobacco advertising with its goal of
reducing underage smoking, its advertising restrictions fail scrutiny
under the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
The FDA asserts, however, that its restrictions are consti-
tutionally permissible because "highly motivated" adults will be
able to obtain tobacco information through allegedly effective
mediums such as black text on a white background. 64 However,
the Supreme Court has specifically held that the use of imagery and
colors in advertising deserves the same "First Amendment Protec-
161 61 Fed. Reg. 44,475.
162 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
16 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,468-69. The FDA unpersuasively argues that its
restrictions merely limit the "time, place and manner" in which tobacco products
may be advertised and therefore are not subject to a strict review under Central
Hudson. 61 Fed Reg. at 44,498. The Supreme Court has held that government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of engaging in
protected speech provided that they are adequately justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
507 U.S. 410, 428 (1983). However, if restrictions are applied selectively to
affect only certain advertised products, the provision will be regarded as content
based regardless of whether alternative channels of communication are available.
Id. Because the FDA's advertising restrictions affect only tobacco products while
allowing similar products to go unregulated, they are content based. Id. Thus, the
FDA's argument that its restrictions merely limit the time, place and manner of
tobacco advertisements fails, and the regulation should be subjected to strict
review under Central Hudson.
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tions afforded verbal commercial speech.' ' 65 Such advertising
draws the attention of the public and often conveys information
directly. 66 The FDA's advertising restrictions are really attempt-
ing to keep the public ignorant of the existence of tobacco products
by camouflaging tobacco advertisements in black-and-white text, in
an effort to delegitimize smoking. The FDA does not have the
broad discretion to suppress truthful information for such paternal-
istic purposes. 67 The First Amendment demands that "the speaker
and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented., 168
Therefore, like the broad ban on alcohol price advertising in
Liquormart, the FDAs restrictions on tobacco advertising prevent
the dissemination of truthful information. Furthermore, the FDAs
regulation disguises the FD.s true objective, the delegitimizing of
smoking, with the all-encompassing interest of protecting children's
health. 169 Such restrictions deserve strict review under Central
Hudson because they suppress the free flow of truthful information
in a clandestine manner.
Because the FDA fails to put forth reliable evidence to support
its self-serving conclusion that advertising promotes youth smoking
and that restrictions on advertising will prevent youth smoking,
they have failed to establish that these restrictions directly advance
the government's substantial interest in preventing youth smoking.
Moreover, the third prong of the Central Hudson test will not
165 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647-49 (1985).
166 See id. In Zauderer, the Supreme Court stated:
[t]he use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important
communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the
advertiser's message, and it may also serve to impart information
directly. Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled to First
Amendmentprotections affordedverbal commercialspeech: restrictions
on the use of visual media of expression in advertising must survive
scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.
Id. at 647.
167 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1511 (1996).
168 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
169 See supra Part I (discussing how the FDA's true purpose behind its
advertising restrictions is to deligitnize smoking).
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tolerate sweeping bans on commercial speech that disguise hidden
government objectives behind unsupported assertions of public
harm.
E. The FDA Regulation Is More Extensive Than Necessary
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test will strike down
any regulation that is more extensive than is necessary to serve the
government's interest.1 70 Liquormart further defined this prong of
the balancing test as requiring the government to show that its
restrictions on speech will reasonably accomplish its goal, and will
do so in a way consistent with the goal's benefits.1 7' Accordingly,
advertising restrictions are not reasonable if the government has
rejected non-restrictive alternatives. 172 In other words, the fourth
prong prevents restriction of commercial speech when restriction is
not necessary. 17
3
In this case, there are several less burdensome means available
to the FDA to advance the objective of preventing underage
smoking. First, better enforcement of current state laws prohibiting
the sale of cigarettes to minors is a less restrictive measure which
would effectively accomplish the government's goal. 74 Through
better enforcement and stiffer penalties for offenders, child access
laws can have a significant direct impact on youth smoking without
burdening speech at all.1 75 Also, government sponsored public
educational campaigns specifically targeted at minors would
provide a reasonable means of advancing the government's aims
without encroaching upon the First Amendment rights of oth-
ers. 176 In fact, the FDA recognizes such alternatives in the access
170 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Corm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
171 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Liquormart Court's application of
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test).
172 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510 (1996).
171 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993).
174 See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol, IL.
171 See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol, IX.
176 See Comments of Brown & Williamson, supra note 8, Vol, IX.
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provisions of its new rule and plans to implement them along with
its advertising restrictions.'77
However, the fact that the FDA plans on regulating child access
to tobacco products and sponsoring educational programs along
with restricting tobacco advertising does not aid the FDA's rule in
satisfying the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. Liquormart
provides that the government may not restrict speech if non-
restrictive alternatives are available that would serve its inter-
est. 1 78 The fourth prong does not merely encourage non-restrictive
means but rather requires government to accept them in lieu of
restrictive ones. Because the FDA could have advanced its goal of
reducing minors' use of tobacco products through non-restrictive
means, but instead restricted truthful speech, its tobacco advertising
restrictions fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
Furthermore, the tobacco advertising restrictions would fail
scrutiny under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test
regardless of whether non-restrictive alternatives exist because their
broad prophylactic effect is more extensive than necessary. The
government has chosen to employ sweeping bans on tobacco
advertising-instead of restricting, on a case-by-case basis, any
particular advertisement which it finds adversely affects chil-
dren.179 The Supreme Court has held that "the free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on
would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful."' 8 Thus, the FDA as a "would-be regulator" has the
177 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
178 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510 (1996).
179 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396.
I80 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1995).
Broad prophylactic rules may not be ... lightly justified if the
protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force. We
are not persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of
visual media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome that the state
is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the more convenient but far




burden of distinguishing harmful, misleading and false advertise-
ments from harmless, helpful and truthful ones. By choosing the
easier prophylactic approach, the FDA has regulated advertising in
a way that is more extensive than necessary. Therefore, the FDA's
regulation fails to survive Central Hudson 's fourth prong.
Incredibly, the FDA argues that the fourth prong is satisfied
because the rule only restricts advertising and promotion that affect
young people, while preserving those aspects of advertising that
provide information to adults.' 8' The FDA's rule does no such
thing. Rather, it drastically limits the flow of information to adults
by "reduc[ing] the adult population to reading only what is fit for
children.' ' 1 82 In Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corporation, the
Court rejected a similar commercial. speech ban for this very
reason. 183 In Bolger, the manufacturer and distributor of contra-
ceptives challenged a federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing
of contraceptive advertisements.8 4 The Court held that, while a
"marginal degree of protection" is achieved by "purging all
mailboxes of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for
adults," a "restriction of this scope is more extensive then the
constitution permits, for the government may not 'reduce the adult
population ... to reading only what is fit for children."" 85
Because less restrictive means to prevent underage smoking are
available, and because the FDA's regulation is a broad prophylactic
ban on the dissemination of information about tobacco products, the
restrictions are more extensive than necessary. Thus the restrictions
fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. Moreover, the
FDA may not reduce the public to reading only that which is fit for
children.
181 61 Fed. Reg. 44,512.
182 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). In Butler, a unanimous
Court reversed a conviction under a statute which made it an offense to make
available to the general public materials found to have a potentially harmful
influence on minors. The Court found the law to be insufficiently tailored since
it denied adults their free speech rights by allowing them to read only what was
acceptable for children to read. Id.
183 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
114 Id. at 61.
'85 Id. at 60, 73 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
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CONCLUSION
The Central Hudson test does not prevent regulators from
addressing social problems. The government has broad authority to
regulate commerce, typically subject only to a "rational basis"
review by the courts.'86 However, where the government attempts
instead to restrict speech in the hope of manipulating consumer
behavior for its own hidden objective-as the FDA has done
through its new tobacco rule-it must then confront the strong
constitutional presumption in favor of the "free flow of commercial
information," and assume the substantial burden of proof required
by Central Hudson and its descendants. 1 7 Because the FDA has
failed to carry this burden as set forth in the third and fourth
prongs of the Central Hudson test, it should be struck down for
violating the First Amendment.
186 Id.
17 Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct.
1495 (1996).
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